

WAGMIHUB Audit Report

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ScaleBit

WAGMIHUB Audit Report

1 Executive Summary

1.1 Project Information

Description	It is an ERC20 token, and its address is https://basescan.org/token/0xE7465A27311c7a65BEe3ddEdb367829e06D57449#code .
Type	Token
Auditors	ScaleBit
Timeline	Mon Jan 20 2025 - Mon Jan 20 2025
Languages	Solidity
Platform	EVM Chains
Methods	Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Manual Review
Source Code	https://github.com/movebit/ClientProjects
Commits	b08d9d3734656400154cb557422d3156da057dd8

1.2 Files in Scope

The following are the SHA1 hashes of the original reviewed files.

ID	File	SHA-1 Hash
WAG	base_0xe7465a27311c7a65bee3dde db367829e06d57449_code/contrac ts/IIII/Wagmi.sol	efe6635775cb35ed82e700c659e16 8b716a8efbb

1.3 Issue Statistic

Item	Count	Fixed	Acknowledged
Total	2	1	1
Informational	1	0	1
Minor	1	1	0
Medium	0	0	0
Major	0	0	0
Critical	0	0	0

1.4 ScaleBit Audit Breakdown

ScaleBit aims to assess repositories for security-related issues, code quality, and compliance with specifications and best practices. Possible issues our team looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Number of rounding errors
- Unchecked External Call
- Unchecked CALL Return Values
- Functionality Checks
- Reentrancy
- Denial of service / logical oversights
- Access control
- Centralization of power
- Business logic issues
- Gas usage
- Fallback function usage
- tx.origin authentication
- Replay attacks
- Coding style issues

1.5 Methodology

The security team adopted the "**Testing and Automated Analysis**", "**Code Review**" and "**Formal Verification**" strategy to perform a complete security test on the code in a way that is closest to the real attack. The main entrance and scope of security testing are stated in the conventions in the "Audit Objective", which can expand to contexts beyond the scope according to the actual testing needs. The main types of this security audit include:

(1) Testing and Automated Analysis

Items to check: state consistency / failure rollback / unit testing / value overflows / parameter verification / unhandled errors / boundary checking / coding specifications.

(2) Code Review

The code scope is illustrated in section 1.2.

(3) Audit Process

- Carry out relevant security tests on the testnet or the mainnet;
- If there are any questions during the audit process, communicate with the code owner in time. The code owners should actively cooperate (this might include providing the latest stable source code, relevant deployment scripts or methods, transaction signature scripts, exchange docking schemes, etc.);
- The necessary information during the audit process will be well documented for both the audit team and the code owner in a timely manner.

2 Summary

This report has been commissioned by Eugene to identify any potential issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the WAGMIHUB smart contract, as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. In this audit, we have utilized various techniques, including manual code review and static analysis, to identify potential vulnerabilities and security issues.

During the audit, we identified 2 issues of varying severity, listed below.

ID	Title	Severity	Status
WAG-1	Single-step Ownership Transfer Can be Dangerous	Minor	Fixed
WAG-2	Unused Owner Role	Informational	Acknowledged

3 Participant Process

Here are the relevant actors with their respective abilities within the **WAGMIHUB** Smart Contract :

Owner

- Owner can renounce the ownership of contract through the `renounceOwnership()` function inherited from the `Ownable.sol` contract.
- Owner can update the contract owner's address through the `transferOwnership()` function inherited from the `Ownable.sol` contract.

User

- Users can transfer tokens to another address through the `transfer()` function inherited from the `ERC20.sol` contract.
- User can approve other addresses to spend tokens on his behalf through the `approve()` function inherited from the `ERC20.sol` contract.
- User can increase the approval amount through the `increaseAllowance()` function inherited from the `ERC20.sol` contract.
- User can decrease the approval amount through the `decreaseAllowance()` function inherited from the `ERC20.sol` contract.
- User can transfer the token from an approved address to another address through the `transferFrom()` function inherited from the `ERC20.sol` contract.

4 Findings

WAG-1 Single-step Ownership Transfer Can be Dangerous

Severity: Minor

Status: Fixed

Code Location:

base_0xe7465a27311c7a65bee3ddedb367829e06d57449_code/contracts/IIII/Wagmi.sol

Descriptions:

The `transferOwnership()` function inherited from the `Ownable.sol` contract has a problem with single-step permission transfer.

Single-step ownership transfer means that if a wrong address was passed when transferring ownership or admin rights it can mean that role is lost forever. If the admin permissions are given to the wrong address within this function, it will cause irreparable damage to the contract.

Suggestion:

It is recommended to use the `Ownable2Step` contract from OZ

(<https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/access/Ownable2Step.sol>) instead.

Resolution:

The ownership has been renounced.

WAG-2 Unused Owner Role

Severity: Informational

Status: Acknowledged

Code Location:

base_0xe7465a27311c7a65bee3ddedb367829e06d57449_code/contracts/IIII/Wagmi.sol

Descriptions:

The Owner role is not actually used in the Wagmi contract.

Suggestion:

It is recommended to remove this role if it is not needed.

Resolution:

This issue has been fixed. The client has adopted our suggestions.

Appendix 1

Issue Level

- **Informational** issues are often recommendations to improve the style of the code or to optimize code that does not affect the overall functionality.
- **Minor** issues are general suggestions relevant to best practices and readability. They don't post any direct risk. Developers are encouraged to fix them.
- **Medium** issues are non-exploitable problems and not security vulnerabilities. They should be fixed unless there is a specific reason not to.
- **Major** issues are security vulnerabilities. They put a portion of users' sensitive information at risk, and often are not directly exploitable. All major issues should be fixed.
- **Critical** issues are directly exploitable security vulnerabilities. They put users' sensitive information at risk. All critical issues should be fixed.

Issue Status

- **Fixed:** The issue has been resolved.
- **Partially Fixed:** The issue has been partially resolved.
- **Acknowledged:** The issue has been acknowledged by the code owner, and the code owner confirms it's as designed, and decides to keep it.

Appendix 2

Disclaimer

This report is based on the scope of materials and documents provided, with a limited review at the time provided. Results may not be complete and do not include all vulnerabilities. The review and this report are provided on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, will be at your own risk. A report does not imply an endorsement of any particular project or team, nor does it guarantee its security. These reports should not be relied upon in any way by any third party, including for the purpose of making any decision to buy or sell products, services, or any other assets. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, WE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS REPORT, ITS CONTENT, RELATED SERVICES AND PRODUCTS, AND YOUR USE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NOT INFRINGEMENT.

